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I INTRODUCTION
Article 5 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of
Terrorism (CECPT) requires member states to criminalise public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence’. In the U.K., the realisa-
tion of this obligation is found in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
Titled Encouragement of terrorism’, section 1 criminalises the pub-
lication of statements that are likely to be understood by a reasonable
person as encouraging some or all of the members of the public to
whom the statement is published to commit, prepare or instigate acts
of terrorism.1 In addition to fulfilling the U.K.’s treaty obligation, the
offence was intended to stop the spread of violent extremist ideology
by supplementing the then-existing common law offence of incite-
ment. Whilst the common law offence of incitement applied to
statements inciting a specific offence (e.g., incitement to murder,
incitement to rob), it did not extend to statements that encourage
terrorist activity in general without identifying a specific offence. The
creation of the encouragement of terrorism offence ensured this
broader reach, in particular by introducing the notion of indirect
encouragement.
There have been a number of rights-based critiques of the
encouragement of terrorism offence that argue that it constitutes an
unjustifiable infringement of the right to freedom of expression.
There is somewhat of a disjuncture, however, between the conclu-
sions reached in this literature and those of the judiciary, both at the
national and transnational level. The right to freedom of expression is
enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR), but it is not an unqualified right. Derogations are
permitted, inter alia, in the interests of national security and for the
prevention of disorder or crime, provided that the derogation is
prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society. Indeed, the
European Court of Human Rights has held that restrictions on
indirect incitement to commit terrorist acts can be Article 10 com-
pliant,2 and it declared a challenge to the offence contained in sec-
tion 58 of the U.K.’s Terrorism Act 2000 (collection of information
or possession of a document likely to be useful to a terrorist) on the
grounds of vagueness and freedom of expression to be manifestly ill-
founded’ and inadmissible.3 Challenges brought before the domestic
1 As amended by s 5 of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019.
2 Hogefeld v Germany, App. no. 35402/97 (20 January 2000).
3 Jobe v United Kingdom, App. no. 48278/09 (14 June 2011).
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courts to this and other terrorism offences on the grounds of freedom
of expression have also been unsuccessful.4 These divergent per-
spectives should not surprise us, since rights express the resolution
within society of situations of conflict between the interests of dif-
ferent members of society’ and so any approach may find expression
in terms of rights, and we do not advance any debate by diverting
attention from the issue of what right-duty relationships are appro-
priate, to a confused discussion over whether one side has, or should
have, rights or not’.5
For this reason, we do not take as the starting point of our critique
the right to freedom of expression. This is not to suggest that this
right is not important in this context. On the contrary, in terms of
counterterrorism policy there are cogent reasons to encourage ideo-
logical debate and discussion. Barendt states that We can only re-
spond intelligently to undesirable extremist attitudes, and remove or
reduce the reasons why they are held, if we allow them, to some
extent, to be disseminated’.6 Indeed, one of the core objectives of the
Prevent strand of the U.K. Government’s counterterrorism strategy
is to counter terrorist ideologies.7 One of the methods for achieving
this is to debate extremist ideas and espouse counter-narratives.8 It is
important, therefore, to ensure that there is careful coordination’
between this work and efforts to prosecute those who encourage acts
of terrorism (which fall under the Pursue strand).9 Counterterrorism
offences that overreach blur the line between the work of Prevent and
Pursue, can render individuals unwilling to participate in Countering
Violent Extremism (CVE) programmes for fear of criminal prose-
cution, and can aggravate feelings of suspicion and resentment on the
4 R v Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 2751; R v Faraz [2012] EWCA Crim 2820; R v
Choudary [2016] EWCA Crim 61.
5 Andrew Halpin, Rights & Law – Analysis & Theory (Hart Publishing, 1997), 264-
265.
6 Eric Barendt, Incitement to, and Glorification of, Terrorism’ in Ivan Hare and
James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford University Press,
2009), 453.
7 HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering
Terrorism (Cm 9608, The Stationery Office, 2018).
8 HM Government, Prevent Strategy (Cm 8092, The Stationery Office, 2011).
9 See HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun-
tering Terrorism (Cm 8123, The Stationery Office, 2011), para 5.41.
INTENTIONAL AND PERFORMATIVE PERSUASION
basis that such programmes are simply a pretext for spying and
surveillance.10
Instead of the right to freedom of expression, this article draws
instead on work from the field of linguistics: namely, speech act
theory (SAT). Using insights from SAT, the article seeks to advance
the legal understanding of the concept of encouragement. When
explaining the meaning of this and related terms, the general ap-
proach of the courts has been to resort to the use of synonyms.11 This
can result in circularity. For example, in R v Marlow12 the defendant
was convicted of the common law offence of incitement. When dis-
cussing the meaning of the word incitement, the Court of Appeal
stated that the word encourages represents as well as any modern
word can the concept involved’, adding that for the purposes of the
offence of incitement encouragement involves words or actions
amounting to a positive step or steps aimed at inciting another to
commit a crime’.13 The analysis in this article seeks to shed light on
what encouragement is by examining some of the linguistic strategies
that may be used to encourage acts of terrorism. In addition, it draws
out two further features of encouragement that have important
implications for the appropriate boundaries of the encouragement of
terrorism offence: encouragement is intentional; and, it is performa-
tive. It will be shown that, by focusing on how others are likely to
understand a published statement, the current version of the offence
does not reflect the nature of encouragement as an intentional
activity. This not only has important consequences in terms of the
breadth of the offence, it also means that a person may be convicted
of the encouragement of terrorism offence even when their publica-
tion of a statement was not an act of encouragement at all. The article
applies these insights to the debate over whether the encouragement
of terrorism offence is human rights compliant, drawing out a series
of proposed amendments to the offence that together address the
10 Keiran Hardy, Hard and Soft Power Approaches to Countering Online
Extremism’ in Maura Conway, Lee Jarvis, Orla Lehane, Stuart Macdonald and Lella
Nouri (eds.), Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response (IOS Press,
2017).
11 Joseph Jaconelli, Incitement: A Study in Language Crime,’ Criminal Law and
Philosophy, online first access <https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%
2Fs11572-017-9427-8.pdf> 19 January 2018.
12 [1997] EWCA Crim 1833.
13 [1997] Crim LR 897 (emphasis added).
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rights-based concerns about the offence whilst maintaining its effec-
tiveness as a counterterrorism tool.
The article begins, in section II, by introducing SAT and
explaining the performativity of language. Section III then outlines
the framework for analysing speech acts. Sections IV, V and VI work
through the three facets of speech acts within SAT in turn: locution,
illocution and perlocution. Section IV focuses on locution, arguing
that the encouragement of terrorism offence rightly encompasses
indirect, as well as direct, encouragement and offering suggestions for
how to elucidate the meaning of indirect encouragement further.
Section V focuses on illocution, arguing that the mens rea of the
encouragement of terrorism offence should reflect the nature of
encouragement as an intentional activity. Section VI focuses on
perlocution, arguing that this part of the offence should be framed in
terms of language performativity. The article concludes by presenting
proposals for the reformulation of the offence.
Before continuing, three further points should be noted. First, the
encouragement of terrorism offence encompasses the encouragement
of acts of terrorism’ and Convention offences’.14 Whilst in this
article we focus solely on the encouragement of acts of terrorism, the
arguments that we advance may equally be applied to the encour-
agement of Convention offences. Second, in order to remain faithful
to the original context, throughout the article we use the word
encouragement when referring to the text of the Terrorism Act 2006
and the word incitement when referring to the scholarship on SAT.
We do not address the question whether the words encouragement
and incitement have subtly different meanings; any such differences
that do exist have no bearing on the arguments that we advance.
Third, in the article we use a number of illustrative examples. These
are taken from a wider research project on online jihadist propa-
ganda. The exclusive use of examples from jihadist propaganda re-
flects only the materials that were available to use and should not be
regarded as downplaying other forms of violent extremism.
14 According to section 20(2) of the Terrorism Act 2006, the term Convention
offence’ means an offence listed in Schedule 1 or an equivalent offence under the law
of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom’. The offences listed in
Schedule 1 include offences involving explosives, hostage-taking, hijacking of aircraft
and ships, and biological, chemical and nuclear weapons
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II THE PERFORMATIVITY OF LANGUAGE
The case for an action-based approach to language – that is, one that
recognises that language not only reflects reality but also shapes it –
has been argued within a number of disciplines, particularly from the
second half of the 20th century onwards. For example, in 1960 one of
the most influential linguists of the 20th century, Roman Jakobson,
proposed a theory of communicative functions of language that
comprised six functions: referential, emotive, conative, phatic, met-
alingual and poetic.15 Only the first of these concerns language as an
exchange of information. The remaining five all involve some action
dimension: the conative’ function refers to relationships between
speakers and what language achieves in this social realm; the poetic’
function attends to the aesthetic dimension of linguistic form and
how it links to specific effects, and so forth.16
Jakobson’s theory of communicative functions was critical in
challenging the view that language simply reflects reality. A similar
concern with the functions of language was held by another highly
influential linguist of the 20th century: the ordinary language
philosopher J.L. Austin. His work – which originally developed as a
series of lectures delivered at Harvard University in 1955 and was
posthumously collected and published in the 1960s – includes the
famousHow to Do Things with Words.17 This book represented a step
forward in terms of articulating how language shapes reality. In it,
Austin argued that language is performative, specifically that it
consists of a series of speech acts by means of which speakers and
hearers achieve things communicatively.18 Examples of speech acts
include apologising (e.g. for wrong doing), naming (e.g. a building or
15 Roman Jakobson, Closing Statements: Linguistics and Poetics’ in Thomas A.
Sebeok (ed.), Style in Language (MIT Press, 1960).
16 The emotive’ function attends to the kind of effects that the expressive and
subjective aspects of talk can have; the phatic’ function refers to the role played by
ritualised communication; and, the metalingual’ or metalinguistic’ function refers to
how language can reflect on itself, including the role it plays in social interaction.
17 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (OUP, 1962).
18 According to SAT, as originally conceived by Austin and especially Searle, even
statements are performative. Searle explained that making a statement (a constative)
carries an illocutionary force and is therefore also a performative – a declaration.
When a speaker utters an indicative sentence (e.g. I like fish’) the speaker takes on a
commitment to the truth of the expressed propositional content and, hence, a change
is effected (John Searle, How performatives work,’ 12 Linguistics and Philosophy 535
(1989)).
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a ship), making a declaration (e.g. in court), complimenting,
promising, etc.
In order for speech acts to be successful – that is, for their func-
tions to be fulfilled – several felicity conditions’ need to be satisfied.19
For instance, the felicity conditions for the speech act of warning (i.e.
the conditions that need to be satisfied for a warning utterance to be
considered to have been successfully issued20) include:
– The Propositional Content condition: a warning refers to a future
event.
– The Preparatory conditions:
• The speaker (S) believes that the event will occur and that it will be
detrimental to the hearer (H)
• S believes that it is not obvious to H that the event will occur
– The Sincerity condition: S genuinely believes that the event will be
detrimental to H
– The Essential condition: the warning counts as an attempt by S to
have H recognise that a future event will be detrimental.21
An example would be a public information campaign informing
citizens of the offence created by section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006.
The campaign warns citizens that the publication of statements that
encourage acts of terrorism may attract criminal liability and result in
a sentence of (up to 15 years’) imprisonment. It refers to a future
event (conviction and imprisonment) (Propositional content condi-
tion). The speaker (the campaign co-ordinator) believes that: con-
viction and imprisonment will follow publication of a proscribed
statement; conviction and imprisonment will be detrimental to the
offender; and, without awareness of the offence being raised, citizens
would not know the consequences of publishing such a statement
(Preparatory conditions). The campaign co-ordinator genuinely be-
lieves that criminal conviction and imprisonment would be detri-
19 See Austin supra n. 17.
20 It is worth noting that a speech act can be successful in providing a warning
even though the warning is not heeded. Similarly, a speech act can be successful in
offering encouragement even if the hearer does not respond to the encouragement.
21 John Searle, Indirect Speech Acts’ in Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan (eds),
Syntax and Semantics: Speech Acts (Academic Press, 1975). Reprinted in John
Searle, Expression and Meaning (CUP, 1979). Note that, in those circumstances in
which H can take effective action against the event referenced in the warning, the
illocutionary force of the speech act (i.e., the warning) is that of seeking a change of
behaviour in H so as to prevent the event.
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mental (Sincerity condition), and the campaign constitutes an at-
tempt to inform citizens that being convicted of the encouragement of
terrorism offence will be detrimental (Essential condition).
SAT also helpfully informs the rationale for including certain uses
of language within the encouragement of terrorism offence. For
example, issue three of (what was then22) Islamic State’s flagship
English-language magazine, Dabiq, contained an article titled Hijrah:
From Hypocrisy to Sincerity’. This used the speech act of warning –
linguistically realised via different means, from affirmative to condi-
tional statements – to warn readers about faith that does not manifest
itself in deeds. Hypocrisy, it said, is discrepancy between what the
inner self encloses and what the outer self discloses’, adding that
minor hypocrisy can beget major hypocrisy’ and an unkept promise
of hijrah to Allah could result in a devastating ending for the slave’.
Applying this to Muslim professionals living in the West (in partic-
ular medics and engineers), the article urged them to answer the call
to hijrah’ and move to the Caliphate. Failure to do so will become a
greater proof against him on Judgment Day’.
The above two examples illustrate the performativity of language.
By warning citizens that it is a criminal offence to publish a statement
that encourages acts of terrorism, the public information campaign
seeks to dissuade them from publishing such statements. In fact, one
of the two key criticisms of the encouragement of terrorism offence is
that its dissuasive effect is even greater than this, and that it inhibits
wider ideological discussion and debate. The article from Dabiq,
meanwhile, used warnings of eternal judgment to try and persuade
Muslims living in the West to uproot and move to the Caliphate.
Thousands responded to the call, some of whom may have read this
article.23 So whether it was refraining from publishing proscribed
statements and participating in ideological discussion, or travelling to
the Caliphate, action was achieved via a series of speech acts per-
formed under appropriate (felicity’) conditions. It is this ability of
language to change the world into which words are spoken that
earmarks speech acts as a potential candidate for criminalisation.
22 Fifteen issues of Dabiqmagazine were published from 2014 – 2016, before it was
replaced by a new magazine titled Rumiyah.
23 It is estimated that more than 22,000 foreign fighters travelled to Syria and Iraq:
United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, Analysis and Rec-
ommendations with Regard to the Global Threat from Foreign Terrorist Fighters
(Report S/2015/358) (United Nations, 2015).
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Importantly, these two examples also illustrate a further point. In
linguistics, it is now generally accepted that the meaning of any
utterance depends on the interplay between the actual words being
relayed and a range of extra-linguistic circumstances (context). For
instance, the text contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006
derives its authority from the fact that it was debated in both
chambers of the Houses of Parliament and received Royal Assent.
Similarly, the article from Dabiq was published at a time when Isla-
mic State’s territory was expanding: a fact that the magazine used to
try and establish the authority of its warning, by claiming evidence of
Allah’s blessing.24 More generally, readership of Dabiq magazine
must be viewed alongside a range of other factors that contribute to
the process of radicalisation (on which more below). In short, all
language is situated.25 This poses a considerable challenge for any
legislator wishing to criminalise some form of speech act. To give
citizens fair warning of the boundaries of the offence created by
section 1, the definition of the offence must specify a priori the
statements (and hence the speech acts) whose publication will attract
criminal liability as clearly as possible.26 This requirement is en-
shrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and its importance has been underlined by the House of Lords.27 The
second of the two key criticisms of the encouragement of terrorism
offence is that the offence fails to meet the demands of fair warning.
Yet, as we will see below, statements may encourage via a number of
different linguistic devices, the import of which may differ markedly
depending on their context. It follows that seeking to construct an
abstract formula that definitively distinguishes encouraging from
non-encouraging statements in advance of their publication is a near
impossible task.
24 Stuart Macdonald, Radicalisers as Regulators: An Examination of Dabiq
Magazine’ in Maura Conway, Lee Jarvis, Orla Lehane, Stuart Macdonald and Lella
Nouri (eds.), Terrorists’ Use of the Internet: Assessment and Response (IOS Press,
2017).
25 Jacob L. Mey, Pragmatics (2nd edn.) (Blackwell, 2001).
26 Keiran Hardy and George Williams, What is Terrorism’? Assessing Domestic
Legal Definitions,’ 16 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 77
(2011).
27 R v Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63, in which Lord Bingham stated no one should
be punished under a law unless it is sufficiently clear and certain to enable him to
know what conduct is forbidden before he does it’ ([33]).
INTENTIONAL AND PERFORMATIVE PERSUASION
III UNDERSTANDING SPEECH ACTS
Any speech act involves three facets, namely:
– The locution, which is the act of saying something. In Austin’s
words, this includes the utterance of certain noises [the phonetic
act], the utterance of certain words in a certain construction [the
phatic act], and the utterance of them with certain meaning’ in the
favourite philosophical sense of that word, i.e., with a certain sense
and with a certain reference [the rhetic act]’.28
– The illocution, which explains the reason for which S is using the
locution, i.e., for asking or answering a question, giving some
information or an assurance or a warning’, etc.29
– The perlocution, which is the effect of what was said: ‘‘the per-
locutionary act always includes some consequences, as when we say
By doing x I was doing y’’’.30
To illustrate these three facets, consider the following example. It
was presented by the jihadist propaganda organisations Global Is-
lamic Media Front and Sawt al-Jihad in Nusantara as being an
official statement from Abu Bakr Bashir (on behalf of the group
Ansar al-Tawhid in Indonesia).
(1) With a deep heart, I ask you to forgive me as I place this great
wish on your strong shoulders, and to continue to be steadfast in
your blessed jihad, and to be blessed with either of the honours:
victory or martyrdom.31
Strictly speaking, this is not a phonetic but a textual (written) act,
namely a post on the website of a jihadist propaganda organisation.
However, whilst SAT was originally developed to account for spoken
language, it has subsequently been applied to any communication,
including written language. In (1) the speech act being performed is
that of requesting: S [the speaker; in this case, the message’s author]
requests that H [the hearer; in this case, those reading the statement]
continues in their blessed jihad’ so as to receive the honour of either
victory or martyrdom, and also that H forgives him for making the
28 See Austin supra n. 17, 92.
29 Ibid, 98.
30 Ibid, 107.
31 Available from the online repository <www.jihadology.net> accessed
December 14, 2017.
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request.32 This request is explicitly stated by S: I ask you to forgive
me … and to continue to be steadfast …, and to be blessed with…’
The speech act’s locution follows a particular linguistic structure, the
core element of which may be represented as follows:
First person singular subject pronoun [I] + present simple verb [ask] + second
person plural direct object pronoun [you] + to-introduced subordinate clause
[to forgive me; to continue to be steadfast …]
As explained above, the context of any speech act is critical in
shaping its meaning. In (1), for example, the official statement’s
context tells us something about the meaning S attaches to the word
jihad’. In addition, it is important to examine the specifics of the
locution, because the particular choice of wording of any speech act
also shapes its meaning.33 This is especially the case when persuasive
purposes are at stake. The order in which information is presented is
known to be crucial when it comes to persuasion.34 So too is framing,
such that the negative consequences of non-persuasion may be
emphasised.35 In (1), framing and ordering are evident in the choice
of words that precede and follow the core aspect of the locution: the
request that H continues to pursue (S’s understanding of) jihad.
Opening the message with the prepositional phrase With a deep
heart’ seeks to appeal to H on the grounds of sincerity and emotion,
as does S’s asking for forgiveness for making the request. Wording
the request as a great wish’, too, may seek to minimise the perceived
degree of imposition on H. Similarly, the final part of the statement
refers to beneficial consequences (being blessed, by either victory or
martyrdom). Together, these features may increase the likelihood of
S’s intention being favourably acted upon by H.
Turning next to illocution, in (1) S expressly states that he is
performing a request. The request is communicated via the use of
32 The terms speaker and hearer are used throughout this article, so as to preserve
the connection to the theory’s origins.
33 Istvan Kecskes, Situation-bound utterances as pragmatic acts,’ 42 Journal of
Pragmatics 2889 (2010).
34 Chris Reed and Derek Long, Content ordering in the generation of persuasive
discourse,’ Proceedings of the 15th International Joint Conference on artificial Intel-
ligence (IJCAI-97) 1022 (1997); Daniel Marcu, Perlocutions: the Achilles’ heel of
speech act theory,’ 32 Journal of Pragmatics 1719 (2000).
35 Beth E. Meyerowitz and Shelly Chaiken, The effect of message framing on
breast self-examination attitudes, intentions and behaviours,’ 52 Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 500 (1987).
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what in SAT is known as an explicit performative: I ask you’.
Alongside other explicit speech act formulae (e.g. I want to express
my gratitude’ for the speech act of thanking), performative verbal
structures such as I ask you’ are what characterise direct speech acts
– that is, acts of communication in which S’s intention is explicated to
H, rather than in any way needing to be implied or inferred by H.
Clearly, not all communication is realised via direct speech acts. This
is especially true of attempts at persuasion, where there are multiple
reasons why a persuader might prefer to employ indirect speech acts,
as we explain further below.
Turning lastly to perlocution, determining the perlocutionary ef-
fect of (1) is far from straightforward, for two reasons. First, any
attempt to establish whether or not the intended perlocutionary effect
(that H continues in his blessed jihad’) has been achieved faces sig-
nificant evidential difficulties. Since the locution of (1) occurred in the
context of a public, online environment, and S did not specify any
particular H to which the request was addressed, (1) can be said to
have been addressed to anyone reading the locution act that under-
stood its illocutionary force. Establishing the identity of these Hs is
difficult, particularly in the case of those that have taken steps to
shield their identity, as is investigating their response to S’s request.
And even if it could be proved that one particular H (out of maybe
thousands) read S’s request and continued in his blessed jihad’ –
perhaps because this H posted a message to the same website using
some form of words that communicated Yes, I will continue’ – this
merely raises a further set of difficulties. Other speech acts and extra-
linguistic factors may also have played a part in (this particular) H’s
decision to continue. This is particularly likely to be the case in
message-saturated digital environments, in which Hs may read mes-
sages such as (1) within a long string of related messages, and may
also be exposed to differently mediated (face-to-face; telephone; so-
cial media, etc.) messages about the same or similar propositional
content. Hs therefore can do nothing but weigh all this information,
plus any additional factors relating to other contexts in which they
may be involved, before deciding whether or not to accede to S’s
request. After all, Hs are independent agents, not automatons who –
upon recognising a given illocutionary force – rush to realise its in-
tended effects.36
36 Dennis Kurzon, The speech act status of incitement: Perlocutionary acts
revisited,’ 29 Journal of Pragmatics 571 (1998).
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IV ENCOURAGING ACTS OF TERRORISM: THE LOCU-
TIONARY ACT
To establish liability for the encouragement of terrorism offence, the
first requirement that must be proved is that the defendant published
a statement or caused another to publish a statement.37 A statement’
is defined as a communication of any description’, and includes
communications without words consisting of sounds or images or
both’.38 This definition is deliberately expansive, and mirrors the
application of SAT to any communication. It also recognises the
important role that images play in persuasion in general and in ter-
rorist propaganda specifically.39 Publishing’ is defined in a similarly
expansive manner, as publishing [the statement] in any manner to the
public’ and expressly includes providing an electronic service by
means of which the public have access to the statement’ and using
such a service … to enable or to facilitate access by the public to
[it]’.40 The legislation’s accompanying explanatory notes explain that
Internet Service Providers and website administrators may therefore
be regarded as publishing statements on their platforms/websites.
There is one restriction, however: the statement must have been
published to the public. The offence does not apply to private com-
munications.41
The other actus reus requirement focuses on the content of the
statement and its likely interpretation. The prosecution must show
that the statement was likely to be understood by a reasonable
person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to
some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published to
the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or
Convention offences’.42 The public’ is defined as the public (or any
section thereof) of any part of the UK or of another country, and
37 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(2)(a).
38 Terrorism Act 2006, s 20(6).
39 Stuart Macdonald and Nuria Lorenzo-Dus, Visual Jihad: Constructing the
Good Muslim’ in Online Jihadist Magazines,’ https://doi.org/10.1080/
1057610X.2018.1559508 accessed 19 June 2019.
40 Terrorism Act 2006, s 20(4).
41 The Government stated that it would be illiberal’ for the offence to apply to
private communications (Baroness Scotland, Hansard HL Vol 676 Col 435 (5
December 2005)).
42 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(1).
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expressly includes public meetings or gatherings (regardless of whe-
ther payment is required to attend).43
Our focus in the remainder of this section is the means of per-
suasion employed in the published statement, specifically, first, the
express inclusion of indirect encouragement and then, second, the
inclusion of glorification as an illustrative example of indirect
encouragement.
4.1 The Express Inclusion of Indirect Encouragement
During the Parliamentary debates on the legislation, concern was
expressed that the notion of indirect encouragement would encom-
pass statements that express understanding and which, as a result,
have the effect of providing encouragement.44 Cherie Blair’s com-
ment, referring to Palestinian suicide bombers, that As long as young
people feel they have got no hope but to blow themselves up you are
never going to make progress’45 was repeatedly offered as an exam-
ple, as was the following statement from Liberal Democrat MP Jenny
Tonge:
This particular brand of terrorism, the suicide bomber, is truly born out of
desperation … Many, many people criticise, many, many people say it is just
another form of terrorism, but I can understand and I am a fairly emotional
person and I am a mother and a grandmother, I think if I had to live in that
situation, and I say this advisedly, I might just consider becoming one myself.
And that is a terrible thing to say46
These concerns about the breadth of the offence were exacerbated by
its stipulation that it is sufficient that the published statement is
likely’ to be understood as indirectly encouraging some’ of the
members of the public to whom the statement is published to ter-
rorism.47 Exactly how many members of the public amounts to
43 Terrorism Act 2006, s 20(3).
44 See, e.g., the speech of Bob Marshall-Andrews during the Commons Committee
stage (Hansard HC Vol 438 Col 845 (2 November 2005)).
45 George Jones and Anton La Guardia, Anger at Cherie sympathy’ for suicide
bombers,’ The Daily Telegraph, June 19, 2002, available at <http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/jordan/1397696/Anger-at-Cherie-sympa-
thy-for-suicide-bombers.html> accessed December 12, 2017.
46 Nicholas Watt, Lib Dem MP: Why I would consider being a suicide bomber,’
The Guardian, January 23, 2004, available at <https://www.theguardian.com/pol-
itics/2004/jan/23/israel.liberaldemocrats> accessed December 12, 2017.
47 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(1).
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some’ is unclear, particularly given that the statement may have a
global audience of millions. Marchand accordingly commented:
It is unreasonable to expect an individual to foresee or ascertain how a
statement will be perceived due to the diverse potential audience and subjec-
tive, personal interpretation of a statement. By basing the universe of crimi-
nalized statements on such vague and unforeseeable concepts, the definition is
also potentially too broad48
Aside from the ambiguity of the wording likely to be understood’
and some … of the members of the public to whom it is published’,
and the uncertainty involved in its application, it is also unnecessary
and places undue weight on a minority’s potential understanding of
the statement. Section 1(4) instructs that, when assessing a statement,
its contents and the circumstances and manner of its publication must
be taken into account. This assessment would include the target
audience of the statement, the diversity of this audience and their
likely interpretation(s) of the statement. Section 1(1) could therefore
simply ask whether the statement (directly or indirectly) encouraged
acts of terrorism. In deciding this, the fact-finder would take into
account all relevant circumstances, including likely minority under-
standings of the statement, as per the instruction contained in sec-
tion 1(4). At present, by contrast, the fact that the statement is likely
to be understood by a reasonable person as encouraging a small
minority of the target audience to terrorism is not merely a relevant
consideration to be considered, but is sufficient in and of itself to
establish the actus reus of the offence. When considering statements
with a potentially global reach and an audience of millions, elevating
the potential views of a minority in this way creates uncertainty and
risks a chilling effect on freedom of expression.
In an effort to address concerns about the notion of indirect
encouragement, Forcese and Roach suggest a schema that presents
‘‘speech space’’’ as five concentric circles of increasing size and argue
that offences like the one contained in section 1 of the Terrorism Act
2006 should not encompass more indirect forms of incitement and
encouragement.49 The outer ring of their schema – labelled Incite-
ment propaganda and operations’ – encompasses speech intentionally
48 Sterling A. Marchand, An Ambiguous Response to a Real Threat: Criminal-
izing the Glorification of Terrorism in Britain,’ 42 George Washington International
Law Review 123 (2010), 144.
49 Craig Forcese and Kent Roach, Criminalizing Terrorist Babble: Canada’s
Dubious New Terrorist Speech Crime,’ 53 Alberta Law Review 35 (2015), 49.
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targeted at furthering the objectives of terrorist groups, whether in
terms of recruiting, counselling, threatening, inciting and the com-
munication of operational tools, and techniques that further terrorist
purposes’.50 The inner circle – labelled free speech core’ – covers
speech that raises no concern from the optic of terrorist radicaliza-
tion’.51 In between these two are three other categories: ideological
speech; apologia; and, radicalized boasting. Forcese and Roach argue
that the first two of these should not be proscribed, since ideological
speech (exchanges that include debates on religious and political
doctrine’) is not, on its face, linked to violence and apologia (speech
that involves celebrations and justifications of past acts of violence’)
is not linked to violence except to the extent that such statements
communicate approval of conduct that might then be emulated (but
which is not itself called for in the statement)’.52 Radicalized boasting
(statements that favour and endorse future acts of violence, but may
be (and presumably usually are) a form of chest-thumping, far re-
moved from operational intent or ability’) is, they state, more diffi-
cult’, but falls short of the incitement to hate associated with a hate
crime … or outright counselling or instructing a terrorism offence’.53
Ultimately, Forcese and Roach’s schema fails to distinguish ade-
quately between the different categories of speech they identify. First,
they appear to place reliance on the speaker’s intention, as shown by
their definition of incitement propaganda and operations quoted in
the previous paragraph. As we will explain below, we agree that the
encouragement of terrorism offence should only apply to those with a
terrorist intention. However, instances of incitement propaganda
cannot be distinguished from ones of radicalized boasting, apologia
or even ideological speech by the presence or absence of a terrorist
intention. A person might engage in any of these forms of speech with
the intention of persuading others to materially support or commit
acts of terrorism. In fact, these more indirect forms of encouragement
are often more persuasive. Marc Antony’s ironic funeral oration is an
oft-cited example.54 In the context of asking others to do something
for us, indirectness may help to save their face (public image) needs




54 See, e.g., See Barendt, Incitement to, and Glorification of, Terrorism,’ supra n.
6, 455.
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and, in so doing, may also address our own face needs as speakers.55
Indirectness can also serve to underline common ground between S
and H, and/or construct S’s identity.56 These are benefits that are well
understood by marketers, advertisers and politicians, amongst others.
Forcese and Roach’s description of radicalized boasting also
contains self-contradictions. Consider the following statement:
Such boasting may favour future acts of violence, but it is not directly tied to
operational intent or ability. It is speech that falls short of the incitement to
hate associated with a hate crime, and does not directly intend to incite or
threaten an offence. Moreover, to the extent that it amounts to instruction, the
risk posed by this colourful speech does not cross a de minimis harm threshold.
Statements like all real Muslims should engage in military jihad’ would rarely
cross the threshold from radicalized boasting’ to incitement propaganda or
operations’57
In this extract, it is said that radicalized boasting does not directly
intend to incite or threaten an offence’. Two sentences later, the
statement all real Muslims should engage in military jihad’ is offered
as an example of radicalized boasting. Yet, depending on the context,
such a statement could well have been made with the intention of
inciting a terrorist act – in which case it would not satisfy Forcese and
Roach’s definition of radicalized boasting but would satisfy their
definition of incitement propaganda and operations. This uncertainty
is compounded by the fact that, a few pages earlier, assertions of a
personal duty to take up arms’ was offered as an example, not of
incitement propaganda or radicalized boasting, but of apologia.58 It
is hard to know, therefore, which category of Forcese and Roach’s
schema the statement all real Muslims should engage in military
jihad’ falls within. This should not come as a surprise since, as we
explained in section III, the meaning of any utterance cannot be
ascertained solely from the words used, shorn of their context. An
utterance’s meaning depends on the interplay between the actual
words relayed and a range of extra-linguistic circumstances. Indeed,
the description of radicalized boasting from Forcese and Roach
55 John Searle, Indirect speech acts’ in Peter Cole and Jerry L. Morgan (eds.),
Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech Acts (Academic Press, 1975).
56 Marina Terkourafi, The puzzle of indirect speech,’ 43 Journal of Pragmatics
2861 (2011).
57 See Forcese and Roach supra n. 49, 57.
58 Ibid, 49.
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above points not only to the locutionary act (endorsement of future
violence) and its illocution (supposed absence of a terrorist intention),
but also the perlocutionary effect (does not cross a de minimis harm
threshold). We will return to perlocution below.
Turning next to ideological speech and apologia, Forcese and
Roach suggest that these are marked by the lack of an overt link to
terrorist violence. Ideological speech, they state, is not, on its face,
linked to violence’, whereas apologia is only linked to violence to the
extent that it suggests that certain conduct should be emulated.59
Choudhury attempts to distinguish between direct encouragement
and indirect encouragement in a similar way. Drawing on anti-dis-
crimination law, he says that in the case of direct encouragement, a
suggestion of encouragement can be found on the face of the state-
ment’, whereas indirect encouragement includes statements which
have the effect of encouragement even though this cannot be gleaned
from the face of the statement’.60 From a linguistic perspective,
however, neither of these suggestions is sustainable.
In section III above we explained that direct speech acts are acts of
communication in which S’s intention is explicated to H. The request
is explicated via an explicit performative in which S expressly states
that he is performing a request. Statement (1) was an example of a
direct speech act, the explicit communicative being the words I ask
you’. As we indicated above, there are other ways in which speech
acts may be performed that do not rely on directness. The reality of
language use is that Ss often do things with words without employing
specific verbs or verb phrases that explicitly state that they are per-
forming such activities. For example, the requestive illocutionary
force of the statement I ask you to forgive me’ could be realised via
many other locutions, including different degrees of indirectness,61
such as:
59 Ibid, 48-49.
60 Tufyal Choudhury, The Terrorism Act 2006: Discouraging Terrorism’ in Ivan
Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2009). A difficulty with this purported distinction is that a suggestion (of
anything) is by definition indirect.
61 In a pioneering and highly influential account of how the speech acts of
requesting and apologising are realised across languages, Blum-Kulka et al identify –
for requests – nine realisation strategies on a scale of indirectness. The most direct is
the use of mood derivable structures (i.e., imperatives) and the most indirect is the
use of mild hints’: Shoshana Blum-Kulka, Juliane House and Gabriele Kasper,
Cross Cultural Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies (Ablex, 1989).
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(1-a) Would you be able to forgive me?’
(1-b) To err is human, to forgive is divine, as the old saying goes’
Whilst (1-a) and (1-b) are requests, neither employs an explicit per-
formative. (1-a) makes use of a query preparatory’ strategy, that is,
an utterance (worded as an interrogative here) containing a reference
to preparatory conditions (e.g. willingness, ability) as conventional-
ized in any specific language’.62 For its part, (1-b) uses the requestive
strategy known as strong hint’, that is, an utterance containing
reference to object or element needed for the implementation of the
act’.63 The strong hint in (1-b) is worded as a culturally-rooted
statement (a proverb or saying). In other words, both (1-a) and (1-b)
use indirectness to realise the act of requesting forgiveness. Which
realisation of the request will be favoured in a particular situation will
depend on a range of factors, some of which (e.g. cultural style) may
not even be linked to the specific context of the communication.64
Indirect speech acts are of considerable practical importance. As
noted above, they can carry more persuasive force than direct acts.
Moreover, some communicative behaviours may hardly ever be
realised directly. Incitement itself is an example. The statement I
incite you to make an explosive’ is syntactically possible, but in
practice S is very unlikely to incite by making such a statement.65
Mey has accordingly developed a theory that accounts both for the
performativity of language and the indirect speech act dilemma’ in
linguistics.66 His theory works from the outside in’: the focus is on
the environment in which both speaker and hearer find their affor-
dances, such that the entire situation is brought to bear on what can
be said in the situation, as well as on what is actually being said’.67
Within this theory, two concepts are key. First, pragmeme. This re-
fers to a general situational prototype, capable of being executed in
the situation’, such as denying, bribing, co-opting, warning, inciting
and so forth.68 Second, practs. These are the instantiated pragmatic
acts via which a pragmeme may be realised. For example, practs of
62 Ibid, 18.
63 Ibid, 18.
64 For example, in some cultures there is a general orientation to indirectness over
directness, whereas in others the reverse applies.
65 See Kurzon supra n. 36.
66 See Mey supra n. 25, 220.
67 See Mey supra n. 25.
68 Ibid, 220.
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the pragmeme of denying may include I have not done X’ (negative
statement of denial), you are wrong’ (affirmative statement of
accusation) and are you out of your mind?’ (a rhetorical question).
The practs of the pragmeme of incitement may include, amongst
many others, realisations such as: we must commit jihad’ (a state-
ment of obligation), making an explosive is easy’ (an affirmative
statement), making an explosive does not require high technical
skills’ (a negative statement) and haven’t you had enough of being
humiliated by the West?’ (a rhetorical question).
Mey further argues that
since no two practs will ever be identical (being realized in an actual situation,
and every situation is different from every other), every pract is at the same
time its own allopract, that is to say a concrete and different realisation of a
particular instantiation of a particular pragmeme [… and] there is no way of
determining a priori what an allopract should look like (and, a fortiriori, what
it cannot look like).69
Two points follow from this. First, attempting to distinguish between
direct and indirect encouragement by asking whether a suggestion of
encouragement and/or violence can be found on the face of the
statement has no basis in action-based theories of language. In fact,
from a speech act perspective such a distinction is incoherent since it
would create a prioristic, arbitrary distinctions between practs
belonging to the same pragmeme, when such distinctions can only be
made in situ (i.e., in relation to a specific context). For example, only
one of the statements don’t you think it is time you inflicted harm
and suffering on the West?’ and haven’t you had enough of being
humiliated by the West?’ mentions violence on its face; yet, both are
examples of the same pragmeme and use the same linguistic realisa-
tion, namely a strong hint syntactically expressed as a rhetorical
question.
Second, an understanding of the distinction between direct speech
acts and indirect speech acts reveals the limited scope of the former.
To limit the encouragement of terrorism offence to statements that
encourage via a direct speech act – that is, statements that employ an
explicit performative such as I encourage you to …’ – would give the
offence such a narrow scope as to render it practically worthless. Both
the utility and the integrity of the offence require that it also
encompasses indirect speech acts. In this regard, it is important to
69 Ibid, 221.
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note that the inclusion within section 1 of indirect encouragement did
not, in fact, represent a significant extension of the common law of
incitement.70 As Hunt observes, As far as Common Law incitement
is concerned, what is said need not expressly exhort the commission
of the offence in order to constitute encouragement’ and the inciter
will be guilty of incitement if they imply that others should commit
the offence’.71 Concerns about the reach of the section 1 offence,
which critics often attributed to its express inclusion of indirect
encouragement, were in fact the product of other features of the
offence – particularly its mens rea requirement, which we discuss in
section V below.72
4.2 The Inclusion of Glorification as an Example of Indirect Encour-
agement
As we saw earlier, section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 is itself a
speech act. It specifies the conduct for which citizens may be con-
victed of, and punished for, the crime of encouragement of terrorism.
We have also examined the distinction between direct speech acts and
indirect speech acts and seen that, within the category of indirect
speech acts, pragmemes have multiple practs. Moreover, in the case
of persuasion–related pragmemes (including incitement), which are
rarely realised via explicit performatives, it is impossible to determine
their illocutionary force without considering factors outside of the
locution itself. The meaning of a given statement of encouragement
depends not only on the specific locution act but also the circum-
stances in which it is performed, including the broader extra-linguistic
context. This is recognised in section 1(4), which instructs fact-finders
to consider the contents of a statement and the circumstances and
manner of its publication. At the same time, the need to assess
statements on an individualized basis poses a serious challenge to
70 Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [1976] RTR 251; Marlow [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 273.
71 Adrian Hunt, Criminal Prohibitions on Direct and Indirect Encouragement of
Terrorism,’ Criminal Law Review 441 (2007), 453.
72 The breadth of the U.K.’s statutory definition of terrorism also contributed to
concerns about the reach of the section 1 offence. This definition was described by a
previous Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation as remarkably broad –
absurdly so in some cases’ (David Anderson, The Terrorism Acts in 2012: Report of
the Independent Reviewer on the Operation of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part 1 of the
Terrorism Act 2006 (The Stationery Office, 2013)) and by the Supreme Court in R v
Gul [2013] UKSC 64 as very far reaching indeed’ ([29]). For detailed analysis of the
definition, see Hardy and Williams supra n. 26.
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attempts to give advance warning of the statements that, in general
terms, will and will not be held to amount to encouragement.
One response to this dilemma is to seek other methods of com-
municating the boundaries of the offence, besides a generalized dic-
tionary-style definition. One such method is the use of illustrative
examples.73 Collectively, a set of illustrative examples can commu-
nicate the key features of the type of situation the legislator is seeking
to prohibit.74 Importantly, such an approach is capable of engen-
dering as much certainty as one based exclusively on rules (if not
more).75 Indeed, during the Parliamentary passage of the Terrorism
Act 2006, the then Home Secretary stated that glorification features
in the Bill as an example of what is encompassed by the concept of
indirect encouragement’.76 Section 1(3) explains that a statement
indirectly encourages terrorism if it satisfies two conditions. The first
is that it glorifies the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism.
Here, glorification means any form of praise or celebration’,77 and
the glorification can relate to a past or future terrorist act or to acts of
terrorism in general.78 Importantly, the second condition is that the
statement is one from which members of the public could reasonably
be expected to infer that what is being glorified is being glorified as
conduct that should be emulated by them in existing circum-
stances’.79 So glorification alone is insufficient to amount to indirect
encouragement; there must be glorification with the inference of
emulation.
During the Parliamentary passage of the Act the Joint Committee
on Human Rights expressed concern at section 1’s use of the term
glorification’, suggesting that it is too vague to form part of a
73 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice: A Preliminary Inquiry (University of
Illinois Press, 1971).
74 For an example of this approach in the context of anti-social behaviour, see
Stuart Macdonald, A Suicidal Woman, Roaming Pigs and a Noisy Trampolinist:
Refining the ASBO’s Definition of Anti-Social Behaviour’,’ 69 Modern Law Review
183 (2006).
75 John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory of Legal Certainty,’ 27
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 (2002).
76 Charles Clarke (Hansard HC Deb 15 February 2006 col 1434).
77 Terrorism Act 2006, s 20(2).
78 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(3)(a).
79 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(3)(b).
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criminal offence which can be committed simply by speaking’.80 Not
all agreed. Hunt pointed out, there is a core understanding of what
constitutes glorification’ of terrorism’ in the sense of praise’ or
celebration’, even if there is penumbra of uncertainty at the frin-
ges’,81 adding that terms such as praise’ and celebration’ are no
more or less precise than obscene’, or insulting’, which form core
elements of speech offences that have survived scrutiny by reference
to the [European Convention on Human Rights’] certainty require-
ments’.82 Barendt also stated that he had no particular quarrel’ with
the use of the term glorification’, explaining:
If the celebration of acts of terrorist violence is understood by listeners as
encouraging them to emulate them, in circumstances where it is also likely that
they will soon commit further terrorist acts, then there is no reason of principle
why a speaker glorifying the acts should not be held as guilty as a speaker using
more direct language83
We would add that, in our opinion, it is ironic that those who criti-
cised the encouragement of terrorism offence for being too vague
should also have called for the removal of an illustrative example that
offered some clarification of the boundaries of the term indirect
encouragement. The demands of fair warning would have been better
served by calling for more illustrative examples of indirect encour-
agement, not the removal of the only one.
Glorification and incitement are two distinct pragmemes, within the
wider category of persuasion. Both may be realised by a number of
different practs. A selection of these practs could usefully be deployed in
section 1 as illustrative examples, for the sake of legal certainty. These
include: obligation/prohibition statements [see example (2)]; statements
of fact’ [see example (3)]; suggestory formulae [see example (4)]; and,
strong hints in the form of rhetorical questions [see example (5)].
(2) It is mandatory for every Muslim – inside of Sham and outside
of it – to support the Islamic State with all what he is capable,
80 Joint Committee on Human Rights, Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human
Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters (3rd report of session 2005-06, HL Paper
75, 2005), para 27.
81 See Hunt supra n. 71, 450.
82 Ibid, 450.
83 See Barendt, Incitement to, and Glorification of, Terrorism,’ supra n. 6, 456.
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through his life, money and tongue and it is forbidden to take a
neutral stance or let it down.84
(3) It is now for nine years that Afghanistan has been burning in the
flames of the invasion of the American invaders, that started
under the pretext of avenging the September event. In the past
nine years, thousands of Afghans have been martyred, injured
and detained by the invading Americans and others forced to
leave.85
(4) In this section, the OSJ (Open Source Jihad), we give our readers
suggestions on how to wage their individual jihad. Here is one
idea of how an individual Muslim may do so. It is a simple idea
and there is not much involved in its preparation. All what is
needed is the willingness to give one’s life for Allah. The
implementation of details of this operation should be subject to
the security requirements. This idea is to use a pickup truck as a
mowing machine, not to mow grass but mow down the enemies
of Allah. You would need a 4WD pickup truck. The stronger
the better. You would then need to weld on steel blades on the
front end of the truck.86
(5) To the Muslims in America I have this to say: How can your
conscience allow you to live in peaceful co-existence with a
nation that is responsible for the tyranny and crimes committed
against your own brothers and sisters? How can you have your
loyalty to a government that is leading the war against Islam
and Muslims?87
The practs in (2) – (5) are linguistically realised via different levels
of indirectness. Examples (2) and (3) are statements. In (2), reference
is made to an obligation (It is mandatory…’) and a prohibition (it is
forbidden…’). In the example, S (the individual who posted the
message) does not present himself/herself as its author’, that is, as
the agent who puts together, composes or scripts the lines that are
uttered’.88 No-one/nothing (e.g. no particular law or reference to
Quran) is actually cited as the author of the statement. Instead
84 News release from al-Ghuraba Foundation for Media Production <https://
shamikh1.info/vb/showthread.php?t=219448>
85 Official Statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Available from the
online repository <www.jihadology.net>
86 Inspire, issue 2, p. 53 (instructional guide titled The ultimate mowing machine’).
87 Inspire, issue 1, p. 58.
88 Erving Goffman, Forms of Talk (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 226.
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authorship is to be attributed to an impersonal it’. For his/ her part,
S appears as the message’s animator’, that is, the sounding box from
which the utterances come’.89 That being the case, and there being
nothing in (2) that indicates that the roles of animator’ and author’
overlap, one cannot infer that the obligation is owed to S. It has been
suggested that appealing to outside forces’ in this way may be
understood as a means of avoiding reactance and preserving – even
nurturing – the goodwill of sympathisers’.90
Identifying authorship in (3) may be easier given that the example
is part of an official statement from the Islamic Emirate of Afgha-
nistan. Therefore, one may attribute authorship to officials from that
Emirate, assigning the individual/s working for them the production
role of animator/s’. In addition, in (3), the content of the statement
makes use of a common argumentation strategy for the construction
of polarised identity groups: the ideological square.’91 Developed by
Teun van Dijk to theorise social identity formation, this concept
relies on four discursive strategies (the four corners of the square) via
which language users seek to construct the identity of the groups/s
with which they wish to affiliate (the in-group/s’) as diametrically
opposed to those they seek to disaffiliate from (the out-groups’),
namely:
1. Emphasize our good properties / actions
2. Emphasize their bad properties / actions
3. Mitigate our bad properties / actions
4. Mitigate their good properties / actions.92
Strategies 2 and 4 are they-ing’93 strategies that discursively
construct the out-group not just as markedly opposed to the we (or
in- group) but also, and importantly in the context of seeking to
encourage others to act against the out-group, as deviant. Thus in (3),
Americans are this deviant out-group that has for a long period of
time (nine years’) invaded Afghanistan (part of the in-group), lying
to it (under the pretext of avenging the September event’) and acting
violently against Afghans, who as a result have been martyred, in-
89 Erving Goffman, Forms of Talk (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981), 226.
90 See Macdonald supra n. 24, 153.
91 Teun van Dijk, Opinions and idologies in the press’ in Allan Bell and Peter
Garrett (eds.), Approaches to Media Discourse (Blackwell, 1998), 33.
92 Ibid, 33.
93 Nik Coupland, Other’ representation’ in J. Jaspers, Jeff Vershueren and Jan-
Osla Östman (eds.), Society and Language Use (John Benjamins, 2010).
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jured and detained’. Such out-grouping or they-ing’ practices do not
explicitly call for retaliation in kind, i.e., an invasion of America by
Afghan people. Instead, they state facts that may be linked to the
illocutionary force of incitement.
Examples (4) and (5) share the fact that they directly address the
intended Hs. In (4), this is done by explicitly stating: In this section,
the OSJ, we give our readers suggestions on how to wage their
individual jihad. Here is one idea of how an individual Muslim may
do so’. What follows is a series of statements that seek to encourage
following the suggestions through repeated reference to their sim-
plicity. In (5) the S prefaces the strong hint strategy with a deontic
modality utterance: I have to say this’. The two rhetorical questions
that follow are the locutions via which two specific requests for action
against America and the American Government are respectively
hinted at: not to co-exist peacefully with America and not to be loyal
to the American Government. The rhetorical essence of the questions
comes from their containing out-grouping or they-ing discourse,
specifically referring to America as a nation that is responsible for
the tyranny and crimes committed against our own brothers and
sisters’, and to the American Government as leading the war against
Islam and Muslims’. Given such emphasising of bad properties
(tyranny) and actions (crimes and war leadership) against the in-
group (our own brothers and sisters’ and Islam and Muslims’), the
only, obvious answer – and hence the encouragement force – is no, I
cannot’.
So the pragmemes of incitement and glorification may be realised
via a number of different practs, all of which could be used in the
legislative definition of the offence as illustrative examples of indirect
encouragement. It should be emphasised that this list of practs is not
intended to be exhaustive. An exhaustive list is impossible because, as
Kurzon states, any statement may constitute incitement given the
appropriate situation’.94 Given this adaptability of the term indirect
encouragement’, we do not believe that the offence definition should
add the gloss or other inducement’ to the words direct or indirect
encouragement’. Not only is it unnecessary surplusage, its implica-
tion that there are other types of statement that are not (directly or
indirectly) encouraging but which are an inducement is also poten-
tially misleading.
94 See Kurzon supra n. 36, 588.
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V ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE
The mens rea of the encouragement of terrorism offence is either an
intention to (directly or indirectly) encourage members of the public
to commit, prepare or instigate acts of terrorism, or recklessness as to
whether the statement will have this effect.95 A defendant may
therefore be convicted of this offence absent proof of a terrorist
intention.96 There is, however, a defence of non-endorsement. This
applies where: (a) the statement neither expressed the defendant’s
views nor had his endorsement; and, (b) in the circumstances it was
clear that the statement neither expressed his views nor had his
endorsement.97 It should be noted that the non-endorsement defence
is only available in cases of reckless encouragement.98 It is therefore
unavailable, not only to those whose purpose is to encourage acts of
terrorism, but also those who foresaw such encouragement as a vir-
tually certain consequence of the statement’s publication (i.e. those
who had an oblique intention to encourage acts of terrorism).99
(It should also be noted that, in the case of an electronically
published statement, the non-endorsement defence is unavailable if,
in the opinion of a police constable, the statement is unlawfully ter-
rorism-related and the defendant fails to comply with a take-down
notice from the constable within two days.100 Concern has been ex-
pressed here about the lack of appropriate checks and balances’.101)
As Chan and Simester explain, mens rea has an important role in
establishing culpability, but it serves other purposes too’.102 These
other purposes include: first, sometimes mens rea constitutes the
morally wrongful character of D’s behaviour in a more fundamental
way, by identifying what kind of action D is performing’; and, sec-
95 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(2)(b).
96 R v Brown [2011] EWCA Crim 2751. In this case the defendant was guilty of the
offence contained in section 2 of the Terrorism Act 2006 (dissemination of terrorist
publications). He sold various terrorist materials via his website, earning over
$100,000. It made no difference that his motivation was financial gain, not ideology.
97 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(6).
98 Terrorism Act 2006, s 1(6).
99 R v Woollin [1999] 1 AC 82.
100 Terrorism Act 2006, s 3.
101 Alex Conte, Human Rights in the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism
(Springer, 2010).
102 Winnie Chan and A. P. Simester, Four Functions of Mens Rea,’ 70 Cambridge
Law Journal 381 (2011), 384.
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ond, mens rea plays a key mediating role in criminalisation, being
part of the trade-off between the protection of potential victims and
the preservation of liberties for potential defendants’.103 Each of
these functions is relevant to the encouragement of terrorism offence.
We will consider them in turn.
First, the mens rea of an offence may assist us in determining the
character of an action. This is certainly true of speech acts. As we saw
in the previous section, according to SAT it is the illocution – S’s
intention behind the locutionary act – that is the key aspect to con-
sider in determining the intrinsic meaning of a speech act. If S lacked
any intention to encourage, it follows that S’s speech act lacks the
necessary illocutionary force to be regarded as an act of encourage-
ment. This insight is valuable in considering the question whether
reckless encouragement ought to be criminalised. In his work on the
law on complicity, Cowley discusses this question and concludes,
tentatively, that reckless enabling by encouragement’ should be.104
As an example, he offers the declaration of English King Henry II
will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?’ – following which, four of
the King’s knights travelled to Canterbury to kill the Archbishop
Thomas Becket. Cowley observes, I think it is possible that Henry
was genuinely reckless rather than calculating on this occasion, but
that such recklessness would be enough to charge him as an accessory
to Becket’s murder’.105
From a linguistic perspective, the King’s utterance could have
been issued as either a conventionally indirect request or an indirect
complaint. In SAT, requests have various components: a head act
(the request proper; a mandatory component) and a series of
grounding moves (e.g. apologies, statements of need, etc; all op-
tional). Blum-Kulka et al identify a total of nine head acts.106 These
vary in terms of directness, with mood derivables (imperatives) being
the most direct and mild hints the most indirect. In between these two
extremes are suggestory formulae (suggestions to do something) and
query preparatories, that is, utterances that contain a convention-
alised reference to a preparatory condition, such as ability or will-
ingness (e.g. Would you mind walking the dog?’ or Could you pass
103 Ibid, 384.
104 Christopher Cowley, Reckless Enabling,’ 14 Criminal Law and Philosophy 51
(2020), 67.
105 Ibid, 65.
106 Shoshana Blum-Kulka, Juliane House and Gabriele Kasper, Cross-Cultural
Pragmatics: Requests and Apologies (Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1989).
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the salt?’). King Henry II’s utterance uses a query preparatory for-
mula. Given this indirectness, it is particularly important to consider
the context in which the utterance was issued in order to assess its
illocutionary force and, therefore, whether it was indeed intended as a
request. The fact that the utterance was issued by a monarch, whose
role regularly entails asking others to do things on his behalf, would
support an interpretation of the utterance as a conventionally indirect
request. Viewed in this way, the King would be deemed to have
intentionally requested the killing, albeit indirectly. No question of
recklessness arises.
The competing interpretation is that the utterance lacked the
illocutionary force of a request and was instead an indirect complaint.
Various contextual factors might support such an interpretation.
Perhaps the King normally expressed his requests directly, e.g. using
mood derivables, or using certain formulae, e.g. I hereby instruct you
…’. Or perhaps the King only issued requests in certain settings, such
as meetings of a particular type, and the utterance was not issued in
one of these. If the utterance is interpreted in this way, it follows that
the King was not requesting that the priest be killed. Yes, the
utterance may have been reckless, as Cowley opines. But the nature
of the speech act is determined by its illocutionary force and, on this
interpretation of the King’s utterance, he did not issue a request and
he did not utter words of encouragement.
To be clear, our argument is not that reckless statements are never
blameworthy. Whether there are some (limited) circumstances in
which such statements may justifiably be criminalised as a distinct
wrong is a separate question that is beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.107 Our point is that statements that were made without an
intention to encourage terrorism should fall outside the section 1
offence, since absent such an intention such statements lack the
necessary illocutionary force to be regarded as the speech act of
encouragement in the first place.
At this point, one might object that we are placing too much
weight on how the term encouragement is understood in SAT. Leg-
islators can extend terms and give them a technical legal meaning if
they wish – particularly if there are strong policy reasons for doing so
107 In some carefully defined circumstances, for example, it might be possible to
regard such statements as a form of endangerment. Cowley’s analysis, meanwhile,
focuses on whether the statement was enabling, as opposed to facilitative (supra n.
104).
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– and it might be argued that there are sound policy reasons for
ensuring that reckless encouragement falls within the section 1 of-
fence.108 We disagree, for two reasons. First, there are equally strong
(if not stronger) policy reasons for excluding reckless encouragement
from the section 1 offence, as we explain in the next paragraph.
Second, a recklessness mens rea standard would be incongruous with
our analysis of the concept of encouragement in the previous section
and the proposed clarification of the term indirect encouragement’
that we offer in the conclusion. As we have explained, it is the illo-
cutionary force of a statement – the reason for which S is using the
locution – that is the key aspect to consider in determining the
meaning of a speech act. On the SAT-based approach we have pro-
posed, a recklessness mens rea standard would therefore be ineffec-
tual. Even if a defendant were found to have published the statement
in question recklessly, so that the mens rea of the offence was
established, without proof of an intention to encourage the
inevitable conclusion would be that the actus reus of encouragement
was absent. King Henry II’s statement illustrates this. If the statement
is interpreted as an intentional (indirect) request, no question of
recklessness arises. Or, if the statement is not interpreted as an
intentional request, it does not (on a SAT perspective) amount to
encouragement even if its utterance was reckless. The only way in
which a recklessness mens rea standard would broaden the scope of
the encouragement of terrorism offence would be if the defendant’s
recklessness was also relevant to the assessment of whether there was
the actus reus of encouragement in the first place. But to accept this
would be to depart from the SAT-based approach for which we have
argued and, by undercutting the relevance of SAT in this context,
leave us with the current ambiguity and confusion that surrounds the
notion of indirect encouragement.
This leads us to the next of the purposes served by mens rea
requirements, namely, that they may preserve the liberties of poten-
tial defendants. As Chan and Simester explain, Setting a more
stringent mens rea requirement means that the prospect of liability
will have less impact on the day-to-day lives of law-abiding individ-
uals’.109 This is important in the current context, given the range of
statements that may foreseeably have the effect of indirectly
108 Thank you to one of the reviewers for encouraging us to address this point.
109 Chan and Simester supra n. 102, 395.
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encouraging individuals to engage in terrorism-related activity. As
explained above, jihadist propaganda frequently encourages acts of
terrorism through the construction of in-group and out-group iden-
tities.110 Ironically, these identities can be reinforced by statements
that were intended to denounce terrorism. An example is the state-
ment from former US President George W. Bush, in the aftermath of
the 9/11 attacks, that Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists’, which is used in Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine to evi-
dence the claim that there are two camps before the world for
mankind to choose between, a camp of Islam – without the body of
Khilafah to represent it at the time – and a camp of kufr – the
crusader coalition’.111 Similarly, statements emphasising the impor-
tance of tolerance are used to reinforce in-group and out-group
identities by highlighting the supposed incompatibility of Islam with
democracy,112 as are discussions of U.S. foreign policy.113 Given the
broad range of statements that may foreseeably have the effect of
indirectly encouraging terrorism, the key question within the current
version of the section 1 offence is whether the publication of the
statement was reckless – which in turn depends on whether or not the
statement’s publication was justified. Whilst many might feel that this
test of justifiability provides them with a sufficient safeguard against
prosecution, this may not be the case for others, such as those from
ethnic minorities and/or those curious about or contemplating
extremist worldviews. For these individuals, this uncertainty con-
tributes to the reluctance to engage in ideological debate and dis-
cussion, the feelings of suspicion and resentment and the
unwillingness to participate in CVE programmes that we identified in
the introduction. Limiting the mens rea of the offence to intentional
encouragement, as we have suggested, would reduce this chilling ef-
fect on freedom of expression and more carefully demarcate the
Prevent and Pursue strands of the U.K.’s counterterrorism strategy.
110 The same applies to the radical right: see, e.g. Lella Nouri and Nuria Lorenzo-
Dus, Investigating Reclaim Australia and Britain First’s Use of Social Media:
Developing a New Model of Imagined Political Communities Online,’ Journal for
Deradicalization #18 1 (2019).
111 Macdonald supra n. 24, 150.
112 Stuart Macdonald, Nyasha Maravanyika, David Nezri, Elliot Parry and Kate
Thomas, Online Jihadist Magazines and the Religious Terrorism’ Thesis,’ 11
Critical Studies on Terrorism 537 (2018).
113 Nuria Lorenzo-Dus and Stuart Macdonald, Othering the West in the online
Jihadist propaganda magazines Inspire and Dabiq,’ 6 Journal of Language, Aggres-
sion and Conflict 79 (2018).
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VI PERLOCUTION
The definition of public provocation to commit a terrorist offence’ found
in Article 5(1) of CECPT includes the requirement that the communica-
tion in question causes a danger that one or more [terrorist] offences may
be committed’. Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 does not contain an
equivalent provision. In fact, according to section 1(5)(b) it is irrelevant
whether any person is in fact encouraged or induced by the statement to
commit, prepareor instigate any such act or offence’. This lackof adanger
requirement was criticised by a number of commentators, including
Barendt, who pointed out that someone could be convicted of the
encouragement of terrorism offence even if the leaflet he published was
only circulated to a handful of people andwas unlikely to persuade any of
them to terrorist offences.114
Performativity refers to the ability of language to shape reality – to
our doing things with words, as per Austin’s famous dictum (see
above). Perlocutionary effect is one of the three facets of performative
speech acts (or pragmemes, in Mey’s terms) – alongside locution and
illocution. In fact, it is arguably the most controversial aspect of SAT,
with some suggesting that it falls outside the remit of SAT alto-
gether.115 Some of the difficulties in establishing perlocutionary effect
were outlined above. These are illustrated by R v Faraz.116 At trial
Faraz, the manager of a bookshop in Birmingham, was convicted on
eleven counts, including seven counts of disseminating a terrorist
publication.117 As part of its case, the prosecution had sought to ad-
duce evidence that a number of known terrorists – including the 7/7
bombers andmembers of the airline liquid bomb plot conspiracy – had
been in possession of publications that had been available at Faraz’s
bookshop. The Court of Appeal held that such evidence may only be
adduced if: (1) there is admissible evidence that the known terrorists
114 Barendt, Incitement to, and Glorification of, Terrorism,’ supra n. 6.
115 Over two decades ago, one of the most influential scholars within Pragmatics
(the field in which SAT is placed) argued that perlocutionary effects do not form part
of the study of pragmatics, since pragmatic [illocutionary] force has to do with goals
rather than with results’ (G. N. Leech, Principles of Pragmatics (Longman, 1983),
203). Kurzon’s detailed study of the incitement pragmeme fully supports Leech’s
view, taking the further step of arguing that perlocutionary acts are outside the
domain of speech act theory’ and calling for the replacement of the term perlocution
with uptake’ (supra n. 36, 595). Marcu’s theoretical take on SAT is tellingly titled
Perlocutions: the Achilles’ heel of speech act theory’ (supra n. 34).
116 [2012] EWCA Crim 2820.
117 Terrorism Act 2006, s 2.
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had in fact been encouraged by the publications to commit terrorist
offences (since this would be relevant to the jury’s consideration of the
likely effect of the publication upon its readership) ([43]); or, (2) it is
admitted for the narrow purpose of determining whether the reader-
ship of the publication included people who were likely to regard the
contents of the publication as encouragement to commit acts of ter-
rorism, in which case it should be accompanied by strict guidance as to
its relevance and a firm health warning as to its limitations’ ([48]).
Importantly, the Court stated:
[I]t was not in doubt that many of the convicted terrorists had other publi-
cations in their possession. It was entirely possible that if they had been
influenced at all they were influenced by that other material rather than that
which was indicted in the present case. It was entirely possible that those of a
jihadi disposition’ acquire all sorts of material as a form of declaration or self-
justification. It did not follow that they were converted to jihadism or were
encouraged by the terms of the publications themselves to commit terrorist acts
([36])
In other words, perlocutionary effect could not be assumed from the
fact that the known terrorists were in possession of the relevant
publications.
The difficulties in establishing the perlocutionary effect of any
public, let-alone mass-mediated, message are as – if not more – acute
in the online realm. The leading empirical study of online radicali-
sation found that, whilst the Internet has created more opportunities
for individuals to become radicalised and appeared to facilitate the
radicalisation process, there was little evidence of self-radicalisation
(that is, where radicalisation occurred without virtual and/or physical
interaction with others).118 Other studies have reached the same
conclusion.119 Only rarely are individuals radicalised simply by
reading, watching or listening to extremist content online, since
118 Ines von Behr, Anais Reding, Charlie Edwards and Luke Gribbon, Radicali-
sation in the Digital Era: The Use of the Internet in 15 Cases of Terrorism and
Extremism (RAND Corporation, 2013).
119 Paul Gill and Emily Corner, Lone-Actor Terrorist Use of the Internet and
Behavioural Correlates’ in Thomas Chen, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald (eds.),
Terrorism Online: Politics, Law and Technology (Routledge, 2015); Paul Gill, Emily
Corner, Amy Thornton and Maura Conway, What are the Roles of the Internet in
Terrorism? Measuring Online Behaviours of Convicted UK Terrorists (VOX-POL
Network of Excellence, 2015); Ghaffar Hussain and Erin Marie Saltman, Jihad
Trending: A Comprehensive Analysis of Online Extremism and How to Counter It
(Quilliam Foundation, 2014).
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radicalisation is a social process.120 And even if a person does self-
radicalise, they are likely to have consumed a large quantity of online
material, so identifying the specific role played by any individual item
will be extremely difficult. To require proof of perlocutionary effect
would, therefore, be to impose an insurmountable obstacle in the vast
majority of cases involving public statements that encourage acts of
terrorism.
Turning to performativity, a distinction may helpfully be drawn
between a defendant’s forum internum (that is, his or her inner con-
victions and beliefs) and the forum externum (the external realm of
action). This distinction is used in German criminal law to justify the
criminalisation of conspiracy.121 If a lone individual merely thinks
about committing a crime, this remains part of his forum internum.
But when an individual agrees with others to commit a crime, his
thoughts join with those of the others and move from the forum
internum to the forum externum. The resultant group dynamic has a
number of important effects, including: the removal of internal con-
straints to becoming involved in criminal activity; a sense of group
identity that solidifies loyalty, encourages risky behaviour, and leads
to individuals acting against their self-interest; and, specialisation of
labour and economies of scale.122 It was for this reason that the Law
Commission for England and Wales opted to retain the (statutory)
offence of conspiracy, commenting that agreements to commit crime
create a special kind of threat’.123 In other words, such agreements –
verbal or otherwise – are performative; they create a danger to the
public that did not previously exist. Similarly, when an individual
publishes a statement to the public that intentionally encourages acts
of terrorism, his thoughts move from the forum internum to the forum
externum. Others may now read his thoughts and beliefs and be
influenced by them. The act of publication thus serves to materialise
the performativity of language; it creates a risk that did not previ-
120 Maura Conway, Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism
and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research’ in Anne Aly, Thomas
Chen, Lee Jarvis and Stuart Macdonald (eds.), Violent Extremism Online: New
Perspectives on Terrorism and the Internet (Routledge, 2016).
121 Liane Wörner, Expanding Criminal Laws by Predating Criminal Responsi-
bility—Punishing Planning and Organizing Terrorist Attacks as a Means to Opti-
mize Effectiveness of Fighting Against Terrorism,’ 13 German Law Journal 1037
(2012).
122 Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory,’ 112 Yale Law Journal 101 (2003).
123 Law Commission, Conspiracy and Attempts: A Consultation Paper (Consul-
tation Paper No 183), para 2.19.
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ously exist that others will read the statement and be encouraged to
act upon it.
The requirement in Article 5(1) of the CECPT that the commu-
nication in question causes a danger that one or more [terrorist]
offences may be committed’ should be understood as stipulating that
the communication was performative, not that it is necessary to prove
perlocutionary effect. This interpretation is consistent with the use of
the word danger’, which points to the potential of the communica-
tion to shape real-world events but does not require this potential to
have been realised. By contrast, the statement in section 1(5)(b) that
it is irrelevant whether the statement in fact encouraged anyone to
commit, prepare or instigate an act of terrorism should be understood
as saying that perlocutionary effect is not a prerequisite of liability for
the encouragement of terrorism offence. Understood in this way,
there is no inconsistency between Article 5(1) and section 1(5)(b). The
problem is rather that each only presents part of the picture. Article
5(1) focuses on performativity, whilst section 1(5)(b) focuses on
perlocutionary effect. Whilst it might perhaps be suggested that the
section 1 offence’s requirement that the statement was published to
the public obliquely limits the offence to performative statements, this
must be rejected. In some cases, a statement that encourages terror-
ism could be published publicly without creating such a danger – such
as where someone shares excerpts of violent extremist propaganda on
a closed, password-protected forum that is open only to individuals
with official security clearance – and so it would be wrong to effec-
tively render the danger requirement redundant in this way. Our
proposed reformulation of the offence accordingly amalgamates the
wording of Article 5(1) and section 1(5)(b) in order to require per-
formativity – in the sense we have described – but not perlocutionary
effect.
VII CONCLUSION
This article has shown that encouragement is, by its very nature, an
intentional and a performative activity. As a pragmeme, its illocu-
tionary force is that of getting another person or group to do
something. This, as we have seen, can be realised via numerous practs
that predominantly share indirectness as a linguistic strategy, from
rhetorical questions and statements of obligation and prohibition to
statements of fact’ and suggestory formulae. Across all these reali-
sations, the intention (or illocutionary force) of encouragement
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points to the commission or preparation of an act of terrorism – be it
the construction of a bomb or weaponisation of a vehicle, to name
but two examples discussed in the article. It is the combination of
uttering such practs in spoken/written/visual form (i.e., locution) with
the intention in their given context of use (i.e., illocution) that make
the speech act of encouragement a performative activity.
Recent U.K. legislation has recognised the importance of tight-
ening overly broad counterterrorism powers.124 In this spirit, using
the insights gleaned from SAT, this article has evaluated the current
formulation of the encouragement of terrorism offence and proposed
a number of amendments. The following is a revised version of the
first five subsections of section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 that
incorporates all of these changes:
1. Encouragement of terrorism
(1) A person (D) commits an offence if:
(a) D publishes a statement to the public, or causes another to do
so;
(b) D publishes the statement (or causes the other to do so) with the
intention of encouraging the commission or preparation of acts
of terrorism; and,
(c) the statement encourages the commission or preparation of acts
of terrorism.
(2) Encouragement may be direct (by statements such as I
encourage you to …’ or I urge you to …’) or indirect (as de-
tailed in subsection (3)).
(3) Statements that indirectly encourage acts of terrorism include
those that use statements of fact, obligation or prohibition,
suggestory formulae and hints (for example in the form of
rhetorical questions) to:
(a) glorify the commission or preparation of acts of terrorism
(whether in the past, in the future or generally); or
(b) denigrate a section of the public
where the statement may reasonably be understood as seeking to
persuade those to whom it is published to commit or prepare acts of
terrorism.
124 See the amendments to TPIMs introduced by Part 2 of the Counter-Terrorism
and Security Act 2015.
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(4) To assess whether a statement encourages the commission or
preparation of acts of terrorism, regard must be had to the
content of the statement, its intention, and the circumstances
and manner of its publication.
(5) It is immaterial whether anything mentioned in subsections (1) –
(3) relates to the commission or preparation of one or more
particular acts of terrorism, of acts of terrorism of a particular
description or of acts of terrorism generally.
(6) An offence is only committed under this section if the statement
created a danger that other people would be encouraged by it to
commit or prepare acts of terrorism, though there is no
requirement that other people were in fact so encouraged.
Subsection (1) states the actus reus and mens rea requirements of
our revised version of the offence. It removes the existing reference to
how the statement is likely to be understood, as well as the reference
to the instigation of acts of terrorism.125 It also requires proof that
the statement was published with the intention of encouraging the
commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. This stricter mens rea
requirement means that there is no longer any need for a defence of
non-endorsement. The three requirements for liability are also
deliberately listed in an order that requires the illocutionary force of
the statement to be considered before an assessment is made of
whether or not the statement encourages terrorism.
The next two subsections provide some clarification of the
meaning of encouragement. Subsection (2) specifies that encourage-
ment may be direct or indirect, and offers examples that illustrate the
limited scope of direct encouragement. Subsection (3) provides a
more comprehensive set of illustrative examples of indirect encour-
agement than the current version of the offence. As well as including
four specific examples of the practs that might be used, it highlights
the fact that a statement may seek to encourage by using these practs
to denigrate an out-group as well as to glorify past or planned acts of
the in-group.
The next three subsections deal with wider aspects of the offence.
Subsection (4) largely mirrors the existing section 1(4), but impor-
tantly adds the intention of the statement to the list of things to
consider when determining whether the statement encourages the
125 Our reason for removing the reference to encouraging another person to
instigate an act of terrorism is that it is unnecessary; such a person can already be
charged under the Serious Crime Act 2007 with intentionally encouraging the
encouragement of terrorism offence.
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commission or preparation of acts of terrorism. Meanwhile subsec-
tion (5) retains what is currently section 1(5)(a), making it clear that
there is no requirement that the statement in question encourage a
specific type of terrorist act. Subsection (6) merges the existing sec-
tion 1(5)(b) with Article 5(1) of CECPT, clarifying that whilst the
offence only encompasses statements that are performative it does not
require proof of perlocutionary effect.
Our reformulation is consistent with the offence’s original ratio-
nale. By including indirect forms of encouragement and retaining the
lack of a requirement that the defendant be shown to have encour-
aged a specific criminal offence, it encompasses those who, in the
words of the then Home Secretary, incite terrorism more ob-
liquely’.126 At the same time, it addresses the key criticisms of the
current version of the offence. Concerns about vagueness are ad-
dressed by providing further clarification of the term indirect
encouragement and by providing that the actus reusmay no longer be
established solely on the basis of whether a fact-finder believes a
reasonable person would be likely to understand the statement as
encouraging some or all of its audience to terrorism, whilst concerns
about over-breadth are addressed by limiting the reach of the offence
to those with a terrorist intention. Our proposed reform is thus more
protective of those who engage in ideological discussion and debate
without any terrorist intention since it excludes them from the scope
of the offence, as opposed to requiring them to rely on prosecutorial
discretion.127 Reducing the overreach of the offence in this way would
more clearly demarcate the Pursue and Prevent strands of the
Government’s counterterrorism strategy, enabling greater coordina-
tion between these two strands of work and reducing the suspicion
that sometimes surrounds CVE programmes.
Whilst our analysis of the U.K.’s encouragement of terrorism
offence did not take as its starting point the Article 10 ECHR right to
126 Charles Clarke (Hansard HC Vol. 438 Col. 334 (26 October 2005)).
127 A prosecution for the encouragement of terrorism offence may only be brought
with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Terrorism Act 2006, s 19).
This was described by the Government as an important safeguard against the pos-
sibility of the offence being used inappropriately (Joint Committee on Human
Rights, Government Response to the Committee’s Third Report of this Session:
Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights: Terrorism Bill and related matters (10th
Report of Session 2005-06, HL Paper 114, 2006)). In R v Gul [2013] UKSC 64 the
Supreme Court criticised this practice of combining overly-broad offence definitions
with reliance on prosecutorial discretion, commenting that it amounts to Parliament
abdicating its legislative responsibility to an unelected official.
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freedom of expression, it is worth noting, by way of conclusion, that
our reformulated version of the offence would be deemed to comply
with the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the
ECHR.128 Perhaps more tellingly, given the relatively low threshold
imposed by the domestic courts and the European Court of Human
Rights, it would also comply with the higher standards set by the U.S.
First Amendment.129 Our proposal may therefore serve as a blue-
print, not just for the UK legislature but also for those in other states
seeking to fulfil their obligations under the CECPT whilst main-
taining respect for human rights.
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128 As noted in the introduction, the jurisprudence to date suggests that even the
current version of the offence complies with the Human Rights Act 1998 and ECHR.
See supra n. 2, n. 3, n. 4 and accompanying text.
129 Arguably, requiring proof that it was the defendant’s intention to encourage
terrorism would, on its own, be sufficient to satisfy the First Amendment (see Elf-
brandt v Russell 384 U.S. 11 (1966) and Noto v United States 367 U.S. 290 (1961)).
Should Brandenburg v Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969) apply, the position is less straight-
forward. In this case the U.S. Supreme Court drew a distinction between advocacy
of the use of force’ and advocacy that is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action’ (447). In terms of
advocacy that is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action, our
reformulation of the offence requires proof that it was the defendant’s intention to
encourage acts of terrorism. In terms of advocacy that is likely to incite or produce
such action, for the reasons already explained we do not believe this should be
interpreted as requiring proof of perlocutionary effect. It should instead be under-
stood as requiring that the advocacy was performative, in which case it is satisfied by
the requirement in our revised version of the section 1 offence that the published
statement created a danger that others would be encouraged to commit or prepare
acts of terrorism. In any event, in terms of the Brandenburg distinction it seems hard
to us to regard statements that encourage acts of terrorism and that are published
publicly with the intention of encouraging others to commit or prepare acts of
terrorism as mere abstract advocacy’ that lacks a close connection to any likely or
intended act (see Barendt supra n. 6, 458).
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